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We study the e￿cient allocation of buyers in the pres-
ence of recommender systems. A recommender system
a￿ects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by re-
ducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence
(ii) its recommendations can be o￿ered as add-ons, which
generates informational externalities. We investigate the
impact of these factors on the e￿cient allocation of buyers
across di￿erent products.
We ￿nd that the e￿cient allocation requires that the
seller with the recommender system has full market share.
If the recommender system is su￿ciently e￿ective in re-
ducing uncertainty, it is optimal to have some products
to be purchased by a larger group of people than oth-
ers. The large group consists of customers with ￿exible
tastes.
1 Introduction
The large volume of transactions on the internet gives
rise to a large accumulation of data about customers and
products. This enables internet sellers to build databases
that consist of personalized data on all their customers,
the customers’ past purchases and the feedback from
those purchases. In this paper we analyze one speci￿c use
of the accumulated information, \recommender systems".
A recommender system is a software program which uses
the accumulated data to make statistical inferences about
what product a particular customer would like when she
returns to the website.
From an economic point of view, a recommender sys-
tem represents an informational linkage that creates addi-
tional surplus by reducing uncertainty for the customers.
In this paper we present a two-period, two-product model
that describes the interaction between a seller employing
a simple recommender system and a competitive fringe
with no such system, to analyze the surplus created by
recommender system. This paper takes an e￿ciency
point of view and investigates how that surplus could be
maximized.
There are usually two sources of uncertainty involved
in the decision process of a customer. She may be unsure
about her tastes and/or characteristics of the products.
In our model, we focus only on product uncertainty in
the on-line market for horizontally di￿erentiated prod-
ucts, where the di￿erence in customers’ tastes translate
into di￿erences in the willingness to pay for decreased un-
certainty. Our recommender system acts as a mechanism
that collects customer evaluations, through which the
seller infers more information about the products. The
seller reveals whatever inference he makes to his \loyal"
customers, those who have made a purchase from him
before. Thus, a loyal customer has the chance to make a
more informed choice using the inference revealed to her
by the recommender system.
As we mentioned above, a recommendation can be con-
sidered as an add-on: it is an additional service a cus-
tomer receives on top of the purchase she makes. Recom-
mendations, however, are di￿erent from typical add-ons
and bundle elements because their quality is determined
endogenously by the information accumulated through
the seller’s sales. Thus the e￿ciency problem of what
market share each seller should have entails informational
externalities. These externalities can be separated into
two elements. The ￿rst element is what we call the \vol-
ume externality". This externality represents the general
coordination element inherent in the problem, which is
that as the seller has more customers, he will be able
to make better recommendations. This element deter-
mines how much of the market the seller should capture
to maximize the surplus. The second one is the \product
1externality". This externality relates to the distribution
of buyers within one seller over di￿erent products. If there
are a lot of customers buying one particular product in
one period, it might be worth having other customers de-
lay the purchase of that product and purchase the other
products for that period. The strength of this e￿ect de-
termines whether equal amounts of information should
be accumulated on each product or whether there are in-
creasing returns to information so that a large volume
of buyers should be induced to buy some products and
provide information at the expense of other products on
which smaller volume of information is gathered. In the
model, the customers di￿er both in the type of product
they prefer and in the intensity of their preferences. Some
buyers are more ￿exible in their choices than others. It is
the buyers with in￿exible tastes who really bene￿t from
the recommendation service.
Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser (1999) consider a rec-
ommender system with a single product and sequential
choice. Ansari, Essegaier and Kohli (2000) describe and
compare methods of prediction which range from classic
linear regression to Bayesian methods.
2 Model
Market The supply side of the market consists of a
seller with a recommender system, denoted by M; and a
competitive fringe of sellers with no recommender system,
denoted by F. The demand side consists of a continuum
of buyers, and each buyer has a choice between one of
two products. Each buyer is characterized by his pref-
erence parameter ￿ which is distributed uniformly over
[￿1;1]. The products are denoted by x 2 f￿1;1g. The
gross utility of a buyer of type ￿ is speci￿ed by:
u(￿;x) = v ￿ (￿ ￿ x)
2 : (1)
As an example consider the product line to be books.
Then the two types of the product can represent \mys-
tery" versus \romance" novels. We can consider the buy-
ers with preference parameters close to ￿1 or 1 as \in￿ex-
ible" and buyers with preference parameter close to 0 as
\￿exible", because the former group would insist on their
favorite kind of book whereas the latter group would not
be adverse to trying other kinds.
Timing and Choices In each period new products ar-
rive and there is some uncertainty about their character-
istics. The sellers and buyers share a common prior on
these products’ types. In period 0 two products, denoted
by l and h, arrive at both sellers. These products are dif-
ferentiated with respect to the priors attached to them.
Let xi 2 f￿1;1g be the true type of product i 2 fl;hg












. The initial priors are di￿erentiated by
", which we refer to as \initial information".
In period 1 a new product, m, arrives with prior ￿m 2
f￿l;￿hg at all sellers. In period 0, neither the buyers nor
the sellers know what the exact value of ￿m will be in
period 1, but they attach 1
2 probability to ￿m being ￿h



















Learning Between periods 0 and 1 seller M receives in-
formation form his buyers. We aggregate the information
as follows: Let ￿i denote the measure of buyers who buy
product i 2 fl;hg from seller M in period 0. Seller M
receives a random signal yi (xi) 2 f￿1;0;1g on the type
of each product i 2 fl;hg between periods 0 and 1, where
Pr(yi (xi) = 0 j xi) = 1 ￿ ￿i
Pr(yi (xi) 2 f￿1;1g j xi) = ￿i
We can interpret a signal of 0 as containing no informa-
tion, or simply the failure to receive an informative signal.
Given that the seller receives a relevant signal, the prob-
ability of the signal being correct is:









. We interpret ￿ as the informativeness
of the signal. Given the probabilistic structure, we view
the recommender system as a mechanism that computes
the posterior beliefs for each product i based on the signal
2yi and reports them only to the buyers who have bought
from him in period 0. The posterior for product i given
signal yi will be denoted by
￿i (yi) ￿ Pr(xi = 1 j yi):
Interpretation There are two products arriving with
symmetric uncertainty attached in period 0. A high "
means there is less uncertainty about each product’s type
and that the two products are highly di￿erentiated. A
low " means uncertainty is high for both products and
that initially the two products look similar. On the other






as the \performance" of the recommender system.
3 Social E￿ciency
In this section we analyze the e￿cient assignment prob-
lem of how to distribute buyers over di￿erent sellers and
products in order to maximize total surplus.
In the absence of a recommender system, the e￿cient
allocation in period 0 is straightforward. Each buyer
should be allocated to the product that gives her the high-
est per period utility, i.e. all buyers with ￿ > 0 should buy
product h and all buyers with ￿ < 0 should buy version
l. Notice that the seller choice does not matter in this
case, because there is no di￿erence between the service
provided by di￿erent sellers.
If we introduce uncertainty and information, it is no
longer true that each buyer should buy the product which
gives her the highest per period expected utility, because
a buyer’s choice of seller and product in period 0 a￿ects
the utility of all the other buyers in period 1. There are
two variables which in￿uence the informational external-
ity: (i) the distribution of buyers over sellers M and F
and (ii) the distribution of buyers over the two di￿erent
products. The ￿rst variable is important because it deter-
mines the aggregate information gathered by seller M and
thus the overall e￿ectiveness of the recommender system
in reducing uncertainty. It is clear that all buyers should
purchase from seller M in period 0 because information
has positive value and the in￿ow of information is max-
imized when seller M has full market share. Therefore,
we ignore the fringe in the remaining analysis.
De￿nition 1 (BALANCE)
A distribution of buyers with (￿h;￿l) is balanced if ￿h =
￿l and unbalanced if ￿i > ￿j for some i 2 fl;hg.
We would like to investigate whether it can be optimal
to create endogenous di￿erentiation through unbalanced
distributions. If the distribution is unbalanced, one prod-
uct is experimented by a larger group of buyers and the
small group of buyers wait to bene￿t from their feedback.
If this is the case, then it is also important for e￿ciency
to know the composition of these groups. This suggests
the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 (SORTING)
A distribution of buyers (￿l;￿h) is:
1. \sorted" if the set of buyers selecting products l and
h are line segments of the form [￿1;x] and [x;1];
2. \shu￿ed " if ￿i > ￿j for some i 2 fl;hg and the set
of buyers selecting product j consists of two segments













Figure 2: Sorting and Shu￿ing for ￿h > ￿l
If a distribution is shu￿ed, it is the in￿exible buyers of
both types that bene￿t more from the endogenous di￿er-
entiation created by the unbalanced distribution. On the
other hand, if a distribution is sorted, it is usually the in-
￿exible buyers of one type receiving information from the
experiences of all other buyers. The individual preference
of a buyer becomes increasingly in￿uential in the deter-
mination of the social surplus as the buyer’s type moves
further away from 0. Therefore, knowing the preference
ranking of each buyer over the two products is essential to
￿nding the right balance between the individual buyers’
interests and the society’s interest, which determines the
e￿cient solution.
In the analysis of the e￿cient distribution (￿l;￿h), we
have to be aware of the fact that the ranking of the util-
ities from the two products might change as we change
3(￿l;￿h). The preference ranking between h and l depends
on the di￿erence between j￿h ￿ ￿lj. For example, if ￿h
is su￿ciently greater than ￿l, then even the buyers who
would prefer product h in a static world, i.e. the buyers
with ￿ > 0, get a higher two-period utility from product
l than product h.
It is also clear that once we restrict attention to full






, where the rankings are in accordance with
the static preferences. However, there could be di￿erent
preference rankings over h and l when the distribution
is unbalanced with ￿l < ￿h. Next we consider optimal
shu￿ed distributions.
Lemma 1 If a shu￿ed distribution with (￿h;￿l) is e￿-
cient, then jS￿j 7 jS+j as ￿h 7 ￿l.
In other words, if it is e￿cient for some positive types
to purchase product l, then it has to be the case that
there are more negative types purchasing l.
Proposition 1 (EFFICIENCY)
In the e￿cient allocation seller M has a full market share
and there is a unique ￿s > 3 such that:
1. for ￿ 6 ￿s, the unique e￿cient distribution of buyers
is balanced and sorted;
2. for ￿s < ￿ < 1, there are two symmetric e￿cient
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Figure 3: E￿cient allocations with ￿h > ￿l
In other words, for low levels of ￿, the e￿cient alloca-
tion with a recommender system does not di￿er from the
e￿cient allocation without a recommender system. With
an increase in ￿, the information provided by the recom-
mender system becomes su￿ciently valuable to make the
e￿cient distribution unbalanced.
Proposition 2 (COMPARATIVE STATICS)
1. At ￿ = ￿s, the degree of unbalance and the degree of
shu￿ing increase discontinuously.
2. For ￿ > ￿s, the degree of unbalance and shu￿ing
increase in ￿.
3. As ￿ ! 1, the distribution for both e￿cient alloca-
tions becomes perfectly shu￿ed.
As information becomes more valuable it is bene￿cial
to increase the degree of unbalance and place a higher
burden on ￿exible buyers. As there is more that the rec-
ommender system can contribute, the in￿exible buyers
increasingly have more to gain than ￿exible buyers.
4 Conclusion
We have shown how the existence of a recommender sys-
tem creates additional surplus and introduces informa-
tional externalities into the problem of optimally dis-
tributing the buyers over di￿erent products. If the rec-
ommender system’s output were independent of the sales,
then buyers would be optimally allocated to the products
in line with their static preferences. As the information
produced by the recommender system is endogenously
determined through the sales, it is not always optimal
to allocate the buyers according to their static prefer-
ences. Typically, the future gains of the in￿exible buyers
more than o￿set the current losses of the ￿exible buy-
ers. As the information produced by the recommender
system becomes more valuable, more ￿exible buyers will
acquire information to improve the future consumption
choice of the in￿exible buyers. Finally. in related work,
Bergemann and Ozmen (2006) analyze how a pro￿t max-
imizing seller can use a recommender system to improve
its revenue management.
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